Oxford Handbooks Online

The Radical Right in the United States of America

Christopher Parker

The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right
Edited by Jens Rydgren

Print Publication Date: Apr 2018 Subject: Sociology, Political Sociology
Online Publication Date: Feb 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.31

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter examines the attitudes, beliefs, and behavior of the reactionary right in the United States. It seeks to provide a better understanding of what motivates the reactionary right, and how such motivations inform the policy preferences and behavior of its constituents. However, the paucity of data restricts the analysis of the reactionary right to a fifty-year span, from the 1960s through the Tea Party. It begins with an overview of reactionary thought, including a brief history of reactionary movements through the mid-twentieth century. It then conducts an assessment of the immediate predecessor of the Tea Party: the John Birch Society. This is followed by an analysis of the contemporary reactionary movement in the United States: the Tea Party, and the movement responsible for the election of Donald Trump. The conclusion also briefly touches upon the continuities (and discontinuities) between the Tea Party and its European counterparts.

Keywords: United States, radical right, right-wing movements, reactionary right, Tea Party, Republican Party, conservatives, reactionary right, John Birch Society, Donald Trump

UNTIL very recently, the Tea Party animated the reactionary right in America. It helped the GOP regain the House in 2010. Further, from the debates over the debt ceiling to immigration reform, the Tea Party has forced the GOP to take very conservative positions and caused a rift in the Republican Party. The success of the Tea Party movement has roused media types and academics alike to better understand whence it came. They wonder how and why it’s come to dominate the political landscape. These are worthy, even necessary questions. However, I believe that gaining traction on those questions requires placing the Tea Party in historical context, because I don’t believe the Tea Party is something new.

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 07 February 2018

What, exactly, is a reactionary movement? According to sociologist Rory McVeigh (2009, 32–33), it is "a social movement that acts on behalf of relatively advantaged groups with the goal of preserving, restoring, and expanding the rights and privileges of its members and constituents. These movements also attempt to deny similar rights and privileges to other groups in society . . . [something that] distinguishes right-wing movements from progressive movements." Who are the "advantaged groups" to which McVeigh refers?

Historically, people who identify with reactionary movements tend to be overwhelmingly white, predominantly male, middle-class, native-born, Christian, and heterosexual. Taken together, this is the classical cultural and racial image of American identity (Canaday 2009; Devos and Banaji 2005; Smith 1997). Further, this stratum of the population is also more likely than other people to favor strong military presence, support stricter moral codes, back free-market capitalism, reject government policies that give minorities a shot at equality, and prefer to maintain the advantaged status of native-born whites over any other social group (Diamond 1995). As middle-class white males with a stake in America —both cultural and economic—members and supporters of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), the John Birch Society (JBS), and the Tea Party committed to fighting what they perceived as tyrannical forces. Moreover, they defended freedom in the (p. 631) face of what they argued were unjust laws and court decisions, ones they cast as oppressive. Each, moreover, suggested that sometimes intolerance is necessary to protect liberty (Broyles 1966; Epstein and Forster 1967; McClean 1995; Parker and Barreto 2013; Welch 1961).

Beginning with the Know-Nothing Party of the 1850s, clear through the Tea Party of today, reactionary movements are motivated by a belief that America is in rapid decline, something that is associated with perceived social and cultural change (Parker and Barreto 2013). Indeed, thanks to interpretive work relying on historical accounts, I have a firm grasp of the macro historical forces that provoke the emergence of right-wing movements. At the individual level, however, beyond race, ethnicity, class, and religious orientation, we know relatively little about why people are drawn to right-wing movements. We know even less about whether or not supporting right-wing movements can explain social and political attitudes and preferences beyond the influence of other factors, including ideology, partisanship, and racial group membership.

In this chapter, I examine the attitudes, beliefs, and behavior of the reactionary right. By the time the present chapter closes, if I've done my job, the reader will emerge with a better understanding of what motivates the reactionary right in the United States, and how such motivations inform the policy preferences and behavior of its constituents. Right off the bat, however, I must be clear about the limits of this examination, the largest of which is its scope. The paucity of data restricts my analysis of the reactionary right to a fifty-year span, from the 1960s through the Tea Party. I begin with an overview of reactionary thought, something that includes a brief history of reactionary movements through the mid-twentieth century. I then conduct an assessment of what I believe is the immediate predecessor of the Tea Party: the John Birch Society. This is followed by an analysis of the contemporary reactionary movement in the United States: the Tea Party,

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 07 February 2018

and the movement responsible for the election of Donald Trump. In the conclusion, I will also briefly touch upon the continuities (and discontinuities) between the Tea Party, and its European counterparts.

Toward an Explanation of the Reactionary Right

So, what is the reactionary right? How, if at all, does it depart from the "establishment" right? The reactionary right is commensurate with what Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab (1970) called "preservatism," or what Clinton Rossiter (1982) identified as "ultraconservatism." Unlike establishment conservatism that tolerates change as a means of maintaining social, political, and economic stability, reactionary conservatives are willing to undermine stability in service to maintaining the social prestige associated with their stratum: white, male, middle-class, relatively old, heterosexual, native-born Americans. Anytime the dominance of this stratum comes into question, as happens (p. 632) when it is threatened by rapid, large-scale social change, it provokes a "reaction" from the dominant group. This reaction includes violating the rule of law, something to which establishment types as far back as John Adams would take exception (Allitt 2009). Further, the "reaction" will, more often than not, include one or more scapegoats to which the group under siege ascribes an ongoing conspiracy (Hofstadter 1965; Lipset and Raab 1970). In other words, the principal way in which the in-group explains its loss of relative prestige is by way of a concerted campaign of displacement directed by the out-group(s).

Many years ago, noted historian, Richard Hofstadter (1965) offered what I believe is an organic framework in which we may better understand the reactionary right. In his seminal work *The Paranoid Style in American Politics*, he wrote that the far right wing practices a style of politics consistent with paranoia. For him, there was no other way to explain the "heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and the conspiratorial fantasy" associated with the Goldwater movement. He is careful to distinguish paranoid politics, or the "paranoid style," from the clinical version. However, he cites important similarities between political and clinical paranoia in that "both tend to be overheated, over-suspicious, overaggressive, grandiose, and apocalyptic in expression" (Hofstadter 1965, 4). The key difference, as he sees it, is that the clinical paranoid perceives *himself* to be the object of the conspiracy. The paranoid politico, on the other hand, perceives the conspiracy to be "directed against a nation, a culture, a way of life whose fate affects not himself but millions of others . . . His sense that his political passions are unselfish and patriotic, in fact, goes far to intensify his feeling of righteousness and his moral indignation" (Hofstadter 1965, 4).

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 07 February 2018

Hofstadter also outlined a belief system on which the paranoid style rests: pseudo-conservatism. The pseudo-conservative is a person who is quick to use the *rhetoric* of conservatism, a belief system that prizes traditions and institutions and has an appreciation for the history of both. Yet, according to Hofstadter, the pseudo-conservative fails to behave like a conservative in that “in the name of upholding traditional American values and institutions and defending them against more or less fictitious dangers, consciously or unconsciously [he] aims at their abolition” (Adorno et al. 1950, 675–676, quoted in Hofstadter 1965, 44.). Furthermore, the pseudo-conservative “believes himself to be living in a world in which he is spied upon, plotted against, betrayed, and very likely destined for ruin” (Hofstadter 1965, ch. 2). This state of mind pushes him to attack a way of life and institutions he purports to revere, pressing his representatives to insist upon a rash of constitutional amendments, including abolishing the income tax, cutting spending on welfare, and charging with treason people who try to weaken the government.

Hofstadter believes such a person is attempting to get a fix on his position in the rapidly changing social system in which members of this group believe their material and/or cultural status to be in decline. Moreover, as Hofstadter suggests, they no longer have something to which they may anchor their American identity. Indeed, the pseudo-conservative has lost his bearings amidst a raft of social changes, much as someone suffering from paranoid social cognition does upon induction into a new social (p. 633) order—be it at school, in a neighborhood, or new job. In this environment, the pseudo-conservative in the paranoid style is simply trying to maintain his social status.

Consider the twentieth century. The Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s provides the first example. Founded in Stone Mountain, Georgia, in 1915, the second version of the “Invisible Empire” was truly a national movement, spreading beyond the South to the states of Washington, Oregon, New York, Indiana, and Michigan, to name but a few (McVeigh 2009). According to a well-researched documentary, by the mid-1920s national membership in this secret organization clocked in at 4 million.”[1] The modal Klan member was white (of course), male, middle-class, heterosexual, and native-born.

To maintain the dominance of the stratum to which they belonged, the Klan stopped at almost nothing. Frequently they relied upon violence to keep “uppity” blacks in their place, as well as Jews and Catholic immigrants. All of this is well known. What’s not so well known is the fact that the Klan also used violence to police white men. White men who beat their wives, were chronic drunks, or cheated on their spouse, among other things, were subject to beatings by Klansmen. In short, the Klan enforced the moral standards of the community. Regardless of the purpose for which it is used, extra-legal violence is, by definition, a violation of the rule of law.

Law and order, of course, is something by which conservatives typically swear. The fact that the Klan employed lynchings and beatings as a means of maintaining social order isn’t news. What is new, though, is the theoretical reason behind them doing so: to maintain the group’s social prestige. It’s abundantly clear now that the Klan perceived their way of life to be under siege. Blacks posed a threat socially, Jews economically, and

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 07 February 2018

Catholics politically. In other words, all three threatened the America with which Klan members identified: white, male, middle-class, older, Christian, native-born, and heterosexual. In the absence of the social-scientific methods and measures to which we now have access, it's difficult to say what, from an empirical perspective, drove people to identify with the Klan.

Social histories of the KKK suggest the complicity of racism and xenophobia, among other things, in the mobilization of the Klan. Unfortunately, we cannot adjudicate this issue for the Invisible Empire. However, if I'm correct in that the KKK of the 1920s represents a pattern of social change followed by the formation of reactionary movements, I remain confident that we can eventually assay the correlates of the reactionary right. We now turn to this task.

The Reactionary Right of the 1960s

Some thirty years after the Klan's renaissance, another reactionary movement emerged. Retired candy manufacturer Robert Welch founded the John Birch Society. Founded in 1958, the organization was born of the anxiety associated with the perceived spread of communism at home and abroad: they believed the "American" way of life threatened (p. 634) by communist subversion (Diamond 1995; Parker and Barreto 2013). During its heyday, the JBS enjoyed a membership that stood at eighty thousand, with six to eight million sympathizers (non-members who nonetheless identified with the organization) (Grupp 1969). By the mid-1960s the movement had spread beyond California and Arizona to the remainder of the country, represented by approximately five thousand local chapters (Grupp 1969). Like the Klan, its members were firmly middle-class. For instance, approximately 33 percent of them completed college, with another 32 percent having attended though not completed college. The comparable numbers for the general public were 10 percent and 12 percent, respectively. Further, only 14 percent of Birchers belonged to the manual-labor class versus 49 percent of the general public (Grupp 1969).

Welch was a big believer in small government. This is no surprise given his business background. But he is best known for his belief that the United States was being torn asunder by communism. He accused President Dwight D. Eisenhower of being in cahoots with the communists, and attempted to impeach Chief Justice Earl Warren for his support of civil rights for blacks. In fact, he suggested that the civil rights movement was, among other things, a means by which communism might gain traction in the United States. Indeed, communism did a lot of heavy lifting for Birchers: anything they perceived as a deviation from the "American" way was labeled "communist." This included racial and gender equality, what they believed was the moral "decay" of American society (e.g., homosexuality, pornography, and the lack of deference to authority), and rising crime rates (Rohter 1969).

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 07 February 2018

At this point, even the skeptical reader must concede the emergence of a strong, consistent pattern. However, as a social scientist, I remain vulnerable on at least one count, for our evidence rests, in the main, on interpretive claims. I have no way of identifying what really underpins identification with reactionary movements, much less assessing the political consequences associated with them. After we account for education, age, and income, does religion remain a factor? What about racism, nativism, or ideology? Does any of the latter group of possible determinants affect the likelihood of someone sympathizing with reactionary movements? Finally, does membership in or identification with a reactionary movement influence individual-level attitudes, policy preferences, and behavior beyond competing, more established explanations?

To answer these questions I turn to a group best known as supporters of the late Arizona senator and presidential candidate Barry Goldwater. After losing a close election in 1960 when John F. Kennedy bested Richard M. Nixon, right-leaning factions of the GOP wished to run a “real” conservative instead of a “me too Democrat” (a moniker akin to today’s “RINO,” or “Republican in name only”). In Goldwater, the GOP at last had a candidate who would completely dismantle the New Deal by shrinking government. On foreign policy, the senator promised to roll back the spread of communism instead of simply containing it, as President Eisenhower had chosen to do. In 1964, Goldwater’s fidelity to small government resulted in his failure to support the Civil Rights Act, a maneuver that won him support in the South. He had also won the support of Strom Thurmond, Goldwater’s Senate colleague from South Carolina, and the leader of the Dixiecrat revolt of 1948. (p. 635)

These are all important reasons I have chosen to draw on Goldwater supporters as proxies for reactionary conservatism in the 1960s. But the most important—if not dispositive—factor for us is the fact that members of the JBS were the senator’s most fervent supporters. In fact, some have even ventured that in the absence of the JBS (including JBS sympathizers), Goldwater might have failed to secure his party’s nomination (Kabaservice 2012; Perlstein 2001). Demographically, Goldwater supporters were very similar to the JBS’s constituency: well educated, all white, older, predominantly male, and members of the white-collar crowd (McEvoy 1971).

Until now, my analysis has been limited by a lack of attitudinal data. Now, however, we can press forward and assay the individual-level underpinnings of reactionary movements, and the extent to which identification with these movements shapes attitudes, policy preferences, and behavior. We begin with the attitudes believed conducive to identification with the reactionary right. We turn to Christopher Towler’s (2014) work on the reactionary right in the 1960s for the bulk of the following analysis. He hypothesized that anxiety about communists infiltrating America, and he was right: as anxiety increased among people in the electorate, the probability of identifying with the reactionary right, indexed by support for Goldwater, increased by 33 percent. This effect is above and beyond that which he found for alternative explanations, including racism, anti-communism, partisanship, and a preference for small government, each of which

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 07 February 2018

increased the likelihood of identifying with the reactionary right by 21 percent, 11 percent, 52 percent (Republican versus Democrat), and 11 percent, respectively.

Now that we have pinned down what promotes identification with the reactionary right, it is time to examine the consequences of attachment to the movement. I turn first to intergroup relations. Net of the effects of racism, anti-communism, partisanship, and ideology, support for Goldwater dampened the way people felt about blacks and Jews. Further, identification with the reactionary right also militated against positive attitudes toward the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), two prominent civil rights organizations. We observe similar but stronger results when the analysis moves to race-related policies in the 1960s.

Towler examines the ways in which reactionary conservatism informed the electorate's views concerning the government's role in school integration, whether or not busing was necessary, and the extent to which they supported integration of their neighborhoods. Conventional wisdom suggests that racism should provide most of the explanatory power we should find once we specify a model. Likewise, in the context of the 1960s, communism and racial equality were often linked in the minds of Goldwater supporters via their association with the JBS. Therefore, anti-communist attitudes must also be taken into account if the results on race-based policy preferences are to be taken seriously.

As it turns out, even after correcting for racism and anti-communism, Towler shows that reactionary conservatism continued to animate people's views on racial policy preferences in the 1960s. Net of the effects of racism and anti-communism, among other things, reactionary conservatism dampened support for government-backed school (p. 636) integration by 11 percent, and by 9 percent for busing. Yet for neighborhood integration, the impact of reactionary conservatism dissolves. Given the size of the effect of racism, which reduced support for integration by 52 percent, reactionary conservatism appears bound up with the negative way in which many whites viewed blacks. This is no big surprise insofar as the prospect of one of "them" moving next door significantly decreases the social distance between blacks and whites to which many whites had become accustomed.

Most would agree that the 1960s were one of the most volatile periods in the relatively short existence of the United States. Many believed, with some justification, that the Soviet Union threatened American security interests. But there were others who subscribed to a way of thinking in which the communist threat—from without and within—was existential: it threatened the "American way of life." Among the ways in which this menace became manifest was through the civil rights movement. But as the analysis makes clear, reactionary conservatism—indexed by support for Goldwater—discriminated between the fear of a communist takeover and the anxiety related to the perception that social change (i.e., the civil rights movement) was happening too fast. Needless to say, this is roughly the same scenario we observed with the Klan and the JBS. Concern with change also had behavioral implications. Even upon correcting for the usual cast of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 07 February 2018

characters that account for political engagement, reactionary conservatism remained an important predictor. This finding indicates that the negative affect associated with change successfully motivated mobilization.

The totality of the work I've reviewed so far suggests continuity on the reactionary right from the 1920s through the 1960s, something that, with Matt Barreto, I've argued elsewhere. But times have changed since then. After all, we now have had a black president, same-sex rights are on the march, and the demographics of America are rapidly changing. Surely there's no place for the reactionary right in the United States now, is it? Of course there is. The next section presents what I think is irrefutable evidence to that effect.

The Tea Party

Around 2009, shortly after President Barack Obama's first inauguration, a group of loosely organized, highly motivated individuals, organizations, and political action committees coalesced to form what has come to be known as the Tea Party. In 2010 the Tea Party boasted major electoral wins in the U.S. House and Senate, defeating both incumbent Republican and Democratic lawmakers alike. These results should come as no great surprise, given the widespread support the movement enjoyed back in 2010. During its height in 2010, the Tea Party claimed a core membership of approximately 550,000 who signed up to be members of at least one of the national Tea Party groups: 1776 Tea Party, ResistNet (Patriot Action Network), Tea Party Express, Tea Party Nation, and Tea Party Patriots. Beyond this core group were two additional (p. 637) constituencies. One consists of the people who attended at least one rally, donated money, or purchased Tea Party literature: an estimated three million people.[2] Another layer consisted of Tea Party sympathizers, people who approved of the Tea Party. According to data from a 2010 University of Washington study, 27 percent of the adult population, or sixty-three million Americans, strongly approved of the Tea Party.[3]

Given this level of support, what did the Tea Party want? From at least one account, the Tea Party believed in a reduced role for the federal government, more fiscal responsibility, lower taxes, a free market, and a commitment to states' rights.[4] Indeed, these are core conservative, even libertarian, principles, very much in keeping with traditional American political culture (see, among others, Smith 2007; Rossiter 1982). What's more, commitment to these values is widely considered patriotic. Yet, time after time, supporters of the Tea Party seemed to be united by something *beyond* a belief in limited government. Specifically, Tea Party sympathizers appeared united in their fervent disdain for President Barack Obama, and seemed to be squarely opposed to any policies that might benefit minority groups.

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 07 February 2018

In the preceding sections we sought to illustrate a pattern we associate with the rise of reactionary movements. From the Klan to the JBS, individuals appear to react to what they perceive as rapid social change in which the social prestige of “real Americans” is under siege. In this section, we take up the question of the Tea Party’s emergence and common Tea Party attitudes in the age of Obama. We argue that the Tea Party represented a right-wing movement, distinct from mainstream conservatism, that reacted with great anxiety to the social and demographic changes in America over the past few decades. Through a comprehensive review of original data we show that Tea Party sympathizers held strong out-group resentment, in particular toward blacks, immigrants, and gays. Briefly, we then assess public opinion data to determine if the findings can be generalized to the population of Tea Party sympathizers at large.

Contemporary observers and Tea Party events gesture toward concerns that transcend limited government and fiscal conservatism. For instance, the NAACP charged the Tea Party with promoting racism, and Tea Party Express leader Mark Williams was chastised by other Tea Party leaders for penning an overtly racist letter poking fun at the NAACP. Their activists were a driving force behind the Arizona state statute SB1070, a bill that, among other things, proposed to empower local authorities to interrogate the immigration status of people who “looked like” immigrants—something that many said would result in the targeting of Latinos for racial profiling. They may be best known for their many caricatures of President Obama, often depicting him as a primate, African “witch doctor,” and modern-day Hitler, among other things. Consider, moreover, the constant references to President Obama as a socialist. In fact, a study issued by Democracy Corps reported that 90 percent of Tea Party supporters believed President Obama to be a socialist; as such, they viewed him as the “defining and motivating threat to the country and its well-being” (Greenberg et al. 2010). Perhaps the fact that the movement harbored members of white nationalist groups helps to explain the apparent intolerance of the movement (Burghart and Zeskind 2010). However, beyond a perception of intolerance, we think there is something deeper in the emergence of the Tea (p. 638) Party that is more in line with studies of paranoia, conspiratorial beliefs, and out-group suspicion—in short, a right-wing reactionary movement.

Demographic Change and the Emergence of the Tea Party

We have already mentioned what we believed triggered the emergence of the Tea Party: the election of the country’s first black president. However, it was not just the election of Obama that triggered the Tea Party, but also the changing demographics and political debates in America over the past forty years. In 1970, 83 percent of the U.S. population was non-Hispanic white, and in 2010 63 percent was non-Hispanic white—a 20 percentage point decline in one generation. Accompanying this change has been an increase in the black, Hispanic, and Asian populations in the United States and a vigorous debate about civil rights and immigration. Whether we’re talking about blacks or

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 07 February 2018

immigrants, the Tea Party and its followers appear to reject the presence of racial "others."

Racial Resentment

For many, the election of the nation's first African American president is evidence of the end of racism in America. Yet the emergence of the Tea Party in the months following the inauguration of Barack Obama, along with the racially charged antics exposed at many of the group's events and rallies, warrants a closer look at the immediacy of racism in America today. As research has shown, racism and racial resentment play an important role in determining not only support for Obama but also support for black candidates in general (Parker, Sawyer, and Towler 2009; Tesler and Sears 2010). The influence of modern-day racism is most known for its place in opposition toward affirmative action and other race-conscious programs (Bobo 1999; Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Feldman and Huddy 2005). The racism that commonly guides contemporary white attitudes has been labeled "racial resentment" and relies upon anti-black affect, or a "pre-existing negative attitude toward blacks" (Feldman and Huddy 2005, 169). In other words, racial resentment is fueled by the gains and growing demands of black Americans (Kinder and Sanders 1996), a resentment that acquired a new level of fuel with the country led by an African American president for the first time in its history.

Old-fashioned racism, based on biological differences between blacks and whites, is no longer acceptable, supplanted by a new, more subtle racism, one that works to predict political attitudes and behaviors (Parker et al. 2009; Sears and Henry 2003). This new form of racism relies on stereotypes surrounding African Americans, stereotypes that suggest that blacks fail to observe treasured American values such as hard work, honesty, and lawfulness (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears 1993). In addition, ascribing these stereotypes to blacks allows for whites to continue justifying their privileged position in society (Bobo and Kleugel 1997, 93–120). The centrality of American values in racial (p. 639) resentment links American individualism to expressions of prejudice (Feldman and Huddy 2005). The attributes (or stereotypes) assigned to blacks—laziness, preference for welfare, predisposition to crime—place them in opposition to the values American society rests upon, isolating and alienating blacks from the ideals that go hand in hand with being a good citizen in America.

The timing behind the emergence of the Tea Party in American politics begs for a further examination of a group that was determined to "take back" their country and fight against a government absorbed by socialism. The Tea Party movement's emphasis on American values and individualism placed many of their policy stances and positions in opposition to minority policies, such as an increase in social programs, including spending for the poor and health care reform. Also, the rhetoric of the Tea Party placed its members in opposition to minority groups in America as well as the new leadership of the country.

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 07 February 2018

The Tea Party's focus on individualism and American values alone are not enough to validate claims of racial resentment. In addition, accusations of racism within the Tea Party existed since its beginning. A 2010 report by the Institute for Research and Education on Human Rights (IREHR) chronicled the involvement of white supremacy groups in the Tea Party since the movement's first events on April 15, 2009; if nothing more, it speaks to the Tea Party's availability as a vehicle for white supremacist recruitment and thought. Other watchdog groups, such as Tea Party Tracker, made it a point to highlight acts of racism and extremism within the Tea Party and at their rallies and events. Beyond the consistent chronicling of individual acts of racism and bigotry, much of the resentment in the Tea Party boiled over at the height of the health care debate. As Congress came together to vote on the proposed health care bill in March 2010, a Tea Party protest boiled over as racial epithets were launched at Rep. John Lewis, a Democrat from Georgia, and Rep. Emanuel Cleaver, a Democrat from Missouri, was spat upon while trying to make it through the crowd at Capitol Hill (Rasmussen and Schoen 2010).

These instances, among others, led to the denunciation of racism and bigotry in the Tea Party movement on a national stage. Although making it clear that the NAACP was not condemning the entire Tea Party as racist, the following reaction from one of the movement's prominent leaders brought racial resentment to the forefront. Mark Williams, a leader of the Tea Party at the time, released a satirical commentary in response to the NAACP resolution. The response was a letter to President Lincoln from "colored people" and not only insinuated ignorance on the part of blacks in America but also reinforced many of the stereotypes central to racial resentment, such as that blacks are lazy and lack a work ethic.

Even as the evidence consistently found the Tea Party rampant with racial resentment and extremism, the movement's members argued that they were following their conservative principles, centered on small government and limited spending—stances that, by their political nature, do not favor minorities or people of color. This position, though, is not new: ideological conservatism is often invoked as a means of avoiding accusations of racism (Sniderman and Piazza 1993). (p. 640)

To date, scholars have worked hard to separate the influence of conservative principles from racial resentment. Whites' disapproval of affirmative action and social welfare programs has been justified by claiming a violation of norms central to conservative principles, such as hard work and self-reliance. The *group dominance approach* stands in opposition to principled conservatism, explaining that groups will use ideology and political symbols to "legitimize" their claims over resources (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Furthermore, scholars have shown not only that racism works in conjunction with the individual values associated with principled conservatism—Kinder and Mendelberg suggest that individualism becomes part of racism—but also that racism goes beyond individualism to predict negative attitudes toward race-conscious policy and politicians of color (Feldman and Huddy 2005; Kinder and Mendelberg 2000; Tesler and Sears 2010). When specifically examining negative attitudes toward President Obama, racism was

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 07 February 2018

found to play a major role regardless of ideological preference (Parker et al. 2009). The emergence of the Tea Party allows for a closer examination of the racial attitudes held by this unique group of Americans, who emphasize the principles of individualism over all else.

Anti-Immigrant Attitudes

Statements about immigration from Tea Party politicians and groups largely portrayed immigration as a threat to Americans or American culture. One glaring example of this is Sharron Angle's 2010 campaign ad "Best Friend," which features a voice-over that ominously states, "Illegals sneaking across our borders putting Americans' jobs and safety at risk," while showing video of dark-skinned actors sneaking around a chain-link fence.[5] Angle was a darling of the Tea Party movement in Nevada and attacked incumbent senator Harry Reid on immigration both in the "Best Friend" ad as well as in a second ad called "At Your Expense" that charged that Reid supported special college tuition rates for undocumented immigrants, which would be paid for by Nevada taxpayers.[6] Both ads juxtaposed the dark-skinned actors portraying illegal immigrants with white Americans working or with their families on the same screen. The implicit racism in Angle's ad was reminiscent of the now notorious "White Hands" ad of Jesse Helms and the "Willie Horton" campaign ad run by George W. Bush in 1988.

Sharron Angle was not the only Tea Party candidate who tried to use the threat of Latino immigration to capture votes in the 2010 election. In Arizona, J. D. Hayworth, John McCain's Republican primary challenger, similarly made immigration one of the central planks of his campaign. Hayworth (2005) had actually written a whole book on the subject of undocumented immigration, called *Whatever It Takes*, in which he argued in favor of increased immigration enforcement and noted that while immigration was clearly good for the country, the proportion of immigrants coming from Mexico was too high because it could lead to American becoming a bicultural nation. In Hayworth's own words, "Bicultural societies are among the least stable in the world" (2005, 30). Hayworth was a strong supporter of Arizona's SB1070 but believed that even more steps had to be taken against undocumented immigrants, stating at a 2010 rally in Mesa, Arizona, that "there is a whole new term: birth tourism. In the jet age there are people (p. 641) who time their gestation period so they give birth on American soil."[7] In an effort to prevent this, Hayworth argued that the state of Arizona should stop birthright citizenship, a view echoed by Russell Pearce, a state senator from Arizona and the architect of SB1070.

Tea Party organizations also sought to portray immigration as a threat to America in the lead-up to the 2010 general election. The Tea Party Nation emailed its roughly thirty-five thousand members in August and asked them to post stories highlighting the victimization of Americans by illegal immigrants. The group specifically asked for stories about undocumented immigrants taking the jobs of members, committing crimes, or undermining business by providing cheap labor to competitors.[8] The Americans for Legal Immigration PAC (ALIPAC) assisted two Tea Party groups, Voice of the People USA and

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 07 February 2018

Tea Party Patriots Live, in coordinating rallies in support of Arizona's SB1070. ALIPAC was supported by the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), an organization designated a hate group by the Southern Poverty Law Center because of its links to white supremacist organizations (Tomasic 2010).

The Tea Party, while denying that its anti-immigrant rhetoric was based on racism, has continued to portray immigration in starkly threatening terms, which, while not explicitly racist, has strong undercurrents of implicit racism, with Sharron Angle's campaign videos being the most obvious example of this. A *New York Times*/CBS News poll released in August 2010 unsurprisingly found that 82 percent of self-identified Tea Party supporters believed illegal immigration was a "serious problem."[9] In the sociology, psychology and political science literatures, the perception of threats from immigrant groups has been shown to be a powerful predictor for approving of immigration restriction and for anti-immigrant attitudes.

It's plain to see that the Tea Party and its followers were concerned with more than small government and fiscal responsibility. But why was this the case? What do blacks and immigrants have in common? Race. More specifically, the ways in which blacks and immigrants (especially the undocumented) represent a departure from the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) representation of American identity with which the United States has become identified. "Real Americans," in other words, are neither black nor born elsewhere. As Parker and Barreto demonstrate to great effect, Tea Partiers were anxious that the America to which they had grown accustomed was under siege from non-WASP groups. For this reason, Tea Partiers were loath to extend rights and benefits to these "others."

From the Tea Party to Trump

Six years into its political existence, many now wonder, where is the Tea Party headed? Are they still influential after the 2012 election, when Tea Partiers failed to help the GOP capture the White House? But failing to secure the executive branch of government, as the Tea Party has shown, isn't the end of the world. In fact, they've shown that holding (p. 642) half of the legislative branch suffices to arrest the change sought by the president and his party. Indeed, the fifty or so Republican members of the House aligned with the Tea Party in some way have managed to frustrate not only President Obama and his agenda but also the conservative establishment.

Since 2010, pundits have declared the Tea Party dead at least eighteen times. Yet their membership continues to climb. For instance, in 2013 IREHR reports that since 2010, card-carrying members of the insurgent group increased from 185,000 to approximately 550,000—a threefold increase. The number of Tea Party sympathizers, however, has recently declined from a high of around 30 percent of the adult U.S. population in 2010 to 20 percent as of the last quarter of 2013, during the federal government shutdown,

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 07 February 2018

though more recent polling data suggest a slight uptick in 2014, with 24 percent identifying themselves as supporters of the movement.[10] In raw numbers, assuming the movement never recovers its pre-shutdown popularity among sympathizers, it still means that 36 million Americans identify with the Tea Party.

If the level of Tea Party sympathizers is subject to periodic dips, the financial backing of the reactionary movement resembles the steady growth we see in the ranks of membership. As of February 2014, the *New York Times* reported that fundraising efforts of Tea Party–affiliated organizations outstripped those associated with establishment conservative groups by a three-to-one margin. During the early stages of the Tea Party insurgency, questions were asked about the authenticity of the movement insofar as the Koch brothers and other big-money donors bankrolled Tea Party organizations. As a result, some on the left derided the Tea Party as a movement funded by wealthy business interests as opposed to the grassroots phenomenon many in the movement claimed it was.

If this represented even a sliver of truth in the early stages of the movement, the same cannot be said now. IREHR reports that 82 percent of individual donors' contributions to Tea Party organizations did not exceed $200. We see a similar pattern as it pertains to Tea Party–related super PACs (independent political action committees capable of raising large sums of money), in which 97 percent of their contributions did not exceed $1,000. If this information is even remotely accurate, and we believe it is, Tea Party fundraising is relatively democratic, buying itself a measure of independence from big-money, special-interest patrons.

So, what keeps the Tea Party thriving? Why does it continue as a major force in American politics? To answer these questions, and many others, we conducted a national survey of one thousand adults in December 2013. As a way of demonstrating that fear and anxiety are the driving force behind Tea Party intransigence, we contrast the attitudes and preferences of Tea Party conservatives with those of non–Tea Party conservatives. If Tea Party resistance is really about fidelity to conservative principles such as law and order, small government, and fiscal responsibility, we should observe no difference among conservatives. If, however, differences do emerge, we can attribute them to fear and anxiety.

As it turns out, the data suggests important fissures among conservatives. I begin with immigrants. Consider the following: 40 percent of non–Tea Party conservatives (p. 643) believe that "restrictive immigration policies are based on racism," while only 18 percent of Tea Party conservatives agree. Perhaps this is why we see such a large gap among conservatives when it comes to supporting comprehensive immigration reform: 80 percent of mainstream conservatives want to see a comprehensive solution to immigration, versus 60 percent of Tea Party conservatives. Again, if resistance were really about conservative principles—law and order, in the case of immigration—these findings would have revealed no differences between the rival conservative camps, but

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 07 February 2018

they did. Piecing together what is implied from the questions, this leads us to conclude that Tea Partiers, relative to establishment types, believe the current policies are adequate.

Another race-related issue encountered by the American public for which I gathered evidence is the controversial Supreme Court decision on the renewal of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). In June 2013, in a 5–4 decision, the Court released several states with a record of violating the voting rights of blacks and other minorities from federal oversight, in which the covered jurisdictions were required to clear any changes to their voting laws with the Department of Justice. This ruling paved the way for states to effectively enact legislation that may have the effect—if not intent—of discriminating against some voters in ways that inhibit their ability to vote. An establishment conservative would object to the continuing necessity of the VRA's preclearance provision as a violation of state sovereignty. Indeed, this constituted a major part of the conservative majority's opinion. However, we have reason to believe that something beyond conservatism informs the Tea Party's opinion on the issue.

Our theory suggests that Tea Party conservatives' support for ruling on the VRA has less to do with the federal government violating states' rights and more to do with the ways in which the ruling will ultimately impede the ability of people of color to vote. We examined our claim by asking people whether or not they believe discrimination remains a problem when it comes to voting rights. As it turns out, roughly 50 percent of establishment conservatives believe discrimination remains a problem, versus just 37 percent of Tea Party conservatives. We acknowledge that the difference isn't especially striking: a mere 13 percentage points. The point, however, isn't the size of the difference. Rather, the point is that there's *any* difference at all.

This assessment of the Tea Party suggests that reports of its death have been overblown. If the Tea Party were truly on its way out, would its membership continue increasing? Would its fundraising be so robust? Would it continue to enjoy such influence on the Republican Party? We don't think so. In addition to the organizational strength it continues to demonstrate, and the political clout it continues to wield, we have also documented the enduring cleavage that exists between establishment conservatives and reactionary conservatives. Our theory indicates establishment conservatives are committed to conventional conservative principles, whereas reactionary conservatives are motivated more by the fear and anxiety associated with the perception that "real" Americans are losing the country.

Having discussed the continuing strength of the Tea Party, and its animating forces in the present, I now take a moment to touch on the Tea Party's prospects in the near (p. 644) future. While the Tea Party *as a movement* with organized chapters, and a caucus in the House of representatives, no longer exists given its absorption by the Republican party, it's not unreasonable to suppose that its supporters were in some way responsible for the way the 2016 presidential election turned out, with the election of businessman turned reality show star Donald Trump. Pushed by the anxiety and anger felt in the aftermath of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 07 February 2018

Obama's election, the Tea Party can claim credit for the GOP takeover of the House of Representatives in the 2010 midterm election cycle, when they won sixty-three seats—a landslide. As it turns out, Tea Party conservatives were more politically engaged than other conservatives, and far more so than progressives (Parker and Barreto 2013, ch. 6). The Tea Party, it seems, lives on: they're Trump supporters.

For instance, in a recent study I conducted in the state of Washington, 83 percent of Tea Party supporters also supported Donald Trump. Further, when compared to establishment Republicans, Trump supporters were more extreme on a range of race-related issues. When asked whether or not race played a role in recent police killings of unarmed blacks, 72 percent of Trump supporters believed race had nothing to do with it, versus 47 percent of more mainstream Republicans. In a related question, one that asked whether race had anything to do with the use of deadly force against blacks, 82 percent of Trump supporters denied that race was an important factor, while 63 percent of establishment Republicans agreed with that sentiment. Shifting gears to immigration, we find similar results. Trump's proposal to build a wall on the southern border with Mexico was wildly popular among his supporters: 87 percent of them strongly agree with it. Only 37 percent of more mainstream Republican partisans thought this was valid. When one considers the relative suspicion with which Trump supporters view "immigrants," the preference for a wall is easier to see: 59 percent of Trump backers believed that immigrants refuse to abide by American laws, versus only 20 percent of their mainstream counterparts in the Republican Party.

The movement saw—and continues to see—Obama as a vessel for the hitherto ignored claims for equality from marginalized groups. While not new, the push for equality by these groups appears to have gained currency on Obama's watch. The simultaneity, suddenness, and force with which marginalized groups pressed their claims during the Obama presidency no doubt contributed to the fear, anxiety, and anger felt by Tea Partiers. If there were any doubt that such sentiments would survive Obama, Trump's ascendance to the White House should remove them. Two reasons dictate this: (1) the data suggest that Tea Party support has shifted to support for Trump, and (2) Trump supporters' intolerance is in line with similar sentiments associated with Tea Party supporters.

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 07 February 2018

Conclusion

My review of the reactionary right in the United States is now complete. At least two things are very clear. First, from the Klan to the Tea Party and now Trump, there is a (p. 645) certain segment of the country that remains anxious and angry when it perceives rapid social change: white, male, native-born, middle-class, Christian, and middle-aged. This is not to say that every person in this group is reactionary. This is patently untrue. Instead, I invite you to think of it in the following way: someone from this group is more likely to harbor reactionary sentiments than, say, someone who is a black, female, working-class, young Jamaican immigrant. Second, reactionaries hold beliefs that lead to policy preferences different from both "liberals" and establishment conservatives. That their preferences depart from establishment conservatives belies reactionaries' claims that they're merely simple—if angry—conservatives.

Moving beyond sympathy for the Klan, for which we have no hard public opinion data, we see these themes play out in the 1960s as well as in the present moment. Similar to the ways in which the Tea Party and its supporters fail to embrace social change now, as it pertains to racial and sexual minorities (Parker and Barreto 2013, ch. 4), the JBS and its supporters failed to embrace change if it involved racially progressive policies. In both cases, even after ideology is taken into account, our theory of reactionary conservatism remains a valid alternative explanation for what I (and Towler) observe. What this suggests is that more than fifty years after the height of the civil rights movement, the event that helped spawn the JBS, reactionary forces once again mobilized, this time in the guise of the Tea Party, to thwart change. The only difference this time is that a single—albeit powerful—person mobilized reactionary forces: the president of the United States.

The discerning reader may ask why it took the prospect of progress for an entire race to jump-start a reactionary movement fifty years ago but a single man is capable of doing so now. As we have discussed elsewhere, it is really quite simple. As the commander in chief, chief law enforcement officer, head of government, et cetera, the president of the United States wields enormous power. However, perhaps more important is what the office represents: the leader of the American people, the titular head of the country. For reactionary conservatives, a black man in the White House is simply too much to bear. It's an affront to their identity as Americans. For them, Barack Obama's "occupation" of the Oval Office symbolizes too much change. They believe the America in which they grew up, the America to which they've become attached, is no more. In like fashion, the reactionaries of an earlier era believed the civil rights movement would ultimately result in the undoing of the country.

Unfortunately, there's no end in sight for reactionary movements. One is always around the corner, waiting to issue a call to arms in response to what its adherents believe is too much change. Apparently these sentiments aren't confined to the United States. Indeed, over the last twenty years or so, this reactionary impulse has swept across Western Europe (Rydgren 2007). To the extent that reactionary impulses may be captured by

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 07 February 2018

support for right-wing parties in Western Europe, there is some overlap between American reactionaries and what I believe are their European counterparts. Whether they are labeled populist or nationalist,[11] they share at least one key characteristic with American reactionaries: resistance to social and cultural change, not economic anxiety.[12] Put differently, on both sides of the Atlantic, reactionaries are concerned about perceived (p. 646) threats from social and cultural "others." Even so, the sources of perceived threat differ. For Europeans, it's primarily about immigrants.[13] For Americans, the threat is more capacious, in that American reactionaries are leery of racial and sexual "others" and fear that "real Americans" are losing their country to these "outsiders" (Parker and Barreto 2013).

So it seems that the United States isn't the only democracy afflicted with such reactionary sentiments. Having said that, we scholars may wonder, where do we go from here? One direction is to try to better understand why, in spite of progressive value shifts over several decades conducive to the spread of democracy (Inglehart and Welzel 2004), we continue to witness the persistence of anti-democratic beliefs in the mass public. We can examine whether reactionary predispositions are products of political socialization. Research now under way by Parker and Towler reveals that reactionary conservatism is passed down from one generation to the next. Even so, as the demographic segment from which reactionary conservatives are drawn—white, Anglo-Saxon, Christian, heterosexual, and native-born—diminishes, so too should their political influence. Of course, as that group's influence continues to wane, the influence of marginalized groups such as racial and sexual minorities, as well as immigrants and women, will continue to rise. As the legendary crooner Sam Cooke said so eloquently: "a change is gonna come." It's just a matter of time.

References

Adorno, T. W., et al. 1950. *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Harper and Row.

Allitt, P. 2009. *The Conservatives: Ideas and Personalities Throughout American History*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Aslandis, P. 2015. "Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspective." *Political Studies* 64, no. 1: 88–104.

Berning, C. C., and E. Schlueter. 2015. "The Dynamics of Radical Right-Wing Populist Party Preferences and Perceived Group Threat: A Comparative Panel Analysis of Three Competing Hypotheses in the Netherlands and Germany." *Social Science Research* 55: 83–93.

Bobo, L. D. 1999. "Prejudice as Group Position: Microfoundations of a Sociological Approach to Racism and Race Relations." *Journal of Social Issues* 55, no. 3: 445–472.

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 07 February 2018

Bobo, L. D., and J. R. Kluegel. 1993. “Opposition to Race-Targeting: Self-Interest, Stratification, Ideology, or Racial Attitudes?” *American Sociological Review* 58: 443–464.

———. 1997. ”Status, Ideology, and Dimensions of Whites’ Racial Beliefs and Attitudes: Progress and Stagnation.” In *Racial Attitudes in the 1990s: Continuity and Change*, ed. Steven A. Tuch and Jack K. Martin. Greenwood, CT: Praeger.

Broyles, J. A. 1966. *The John Birch Society: Anatomy of a Protest*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Burghart, D., and L. Zeskind. 2010. “Special Report to the NAACP on the Tea Party Movement: Tea Party Nation.” Institute for Research on Education and Human Rights, August 24.

Canaday, M. 2009. *The Straight State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Devos, T., and M. R. Banaji. 2005. “American = White?” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 88, no. 3: 447–466.

Diamond, S. 1995. *Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States*. New York: Guilford Press.

Eger, M. A., and S. Valdez. 2014. “Neo-Nationalism in Western Europe.” *European Sociological Review* 31, no. 1: 115–130.

Epstein, B. R., and A. Forster. 1967. *The Radical Right: Report on the John Birch Society and Its Allies*. New York: Vintage Books.

Feldman, S., and L. Huddy. 2005. “Racial Resentment and White Opposition to Race-Conscious Programs: Principles or Prejudice?” *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 1: 168–183.

Greenberg, S. B., J. Carville, J. Gerstein, P. M. Craighill, and K. Monninger. 2010. “Special Report on the Tea Party Movement: The Tea Party—An Ideological Republican Grass-Roots Movement—but Don’t Mistake It for a Populist Rebellion.” Democracy Corps, July 19.

Grupp, F.W., Jr. 1969. “The Political Perspectives of Birch Society Members.” In *The American Right Wing: Readings in Political Behavior*, ed. Robert A. Schoenberger. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Hayworth, J. D. 2005. *Whatever It Takes: Illegal Immigration, Border Security, and the War on Terror*. Washington, DC: Regnery.

Hofstadter, R. 1965. *The Paranoid Style in American Politics*. New York: Vintage Books.

(p. 648) Inglehart, R., and C. Welzel. 2004. *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 07 February 2018

Ivarsflaten, E. 2008. “What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-examining Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases.” *Comparative Political Studies* 41, no. 1: 3–23.

Kabaservice, G. 2012. *Rule and Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and the Destruction of the Republican Party, from Eisenhower to the Tea Party*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kinder, D. R., and T. Mendelberg. 2000. “Individualism Reconsidered.” In *Racialized Politics: The Debate About Racism in America*, ed. D. O. Sears, J. Sidanius, and L. Bobo, 44–74. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kinder, D. R., and L. M. Sanders. 1996. *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kriesi, H. 2014. “The Populist Challenge.” *West European Politics* 37, no. 2: 361–378.

Lipset, S. M., and E. Raab. 1970. *The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in American Politics, 1790–1970*. New York: Harper and Row.

McClean, N. 1995. *Behind the Mask of Chivalry: The Making of the Second Ku Klux Klan*. New York: Oxford University Press.

McEvoy, J., III. 1971. *Radicals or Conservatives? The Contemporary American Right*. Chicago: Rand McNally.

McVeigh, R. 2009. *The Rise of the Ku Klux Klan: Right-Wing Movements and National Politics*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Mudde, C. 2007. *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Parker, C., and M. Barreto. 2013. *Change They Can’t Believe In: The Tea Party and Reactionary Politics in America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Parker, C., M. Q. Sawyer, and C. Towler. 2009. “A Black Man in the White House? The Role of Racism and Patriotism in the 2008 Presidential Election.” *Du Bois Review* 6, no. 1: 193–217.

Perlstein, R. 2001. *Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus*. New York: Hill and Wang.

Rasmussen, S., and D. Schoen. 2010. *Mad as Hell: How the Tea Party Movement Is Fundamentally Remaking Our Two-Party System*. New York: HarperCollins.

Rohter, I. S. 1969. “Social and Psychological Determinants of Radical Rightism.” In *The American Right Wing: Readings in American Political Behavior*, ed. R. A. Schoenberger. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 07 February 2018

Rossiter, C. 1982. *Conservatism in America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Rydgren, J. 2007. “The Sociology of the Radical Right.” *American Review of Sociology* 33: 241–262.

———. 2008 “Immigration Sceptics, Xenophobes or Racists? Radical Right-Wing Voting in Six West European Countries.” *European Journal of Political Research* 47: 737–765.

Sears, D. O. 1993. “Symbolic Politics: A Socio-Psychological Theory.” In *Explorations in Political Psychology*, ed. S. Iyengar and W. J. McGuire. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Sears, D. O., and P. J. Henry. 2003. “The Origins of Symbolic Racism.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 85, no. 2: 259–275.

Sidanius, J., and F. Pratto. 1999. *Social Dominance*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Smith, M. A. 2007. *The Right Talk: How Conservatives Transformed the Great Society into the Economic Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

(p. 649) Smith, R. M. 1997. *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Sniderman, P. M., and T. Piazza. 1993. *The Scar of Race*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Tesler, M., and D. O. Sears. 2010. *Obama’s Race: The 2008 Election and the Dream of A Post-Racial America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Tomasic, J. 2010. “Tea Party Groups Rallying in Support of Arizona Immigration Law.” *Colorado Independent*, May 6.

http://www.coloradoindependent.com/52903/tea-party-groups-rallying-in-support-of-arizona-immigration-law.

Towler, C. 2014. “Reactionary or Traditional Conservatism? The Origins and Consequences of the Far Right Movement of the 1960s.” Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Washington.

Welch, R. 1961. *The Blue Book of the John Birch Society*. Western Islands: R. Welch.

Notes:

(1.) http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/films/klansville/

(2.) Data compiled by Devin Burghart, Institute for Research on Education and Human Rights.

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 07 February 2018

(3.) Multi-State Survey on Race and Politics (MSSRP), 2010.

(4.) http://www.teapartypatriots.org/ourvision/.

(5.) “Sharron Angle TV Ad: ‘Best Friend.’ ” YouTube, posted by sharronangle, September 14, 2010. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tb-zZM9-vB0.

(6.) “Sharron Angle TV Ad: ‘At Your Expense.’ ” YouTube, posted by sharronangle, September 23, 2010. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uJC_RmcO7Ts.

(7.) Paul Harris, “JD Hayworth’s Republican Challenge to John McCain Grows as Anti-Immigrant Anger Spills onto Arizona’s Streets,” *Guardian*, July 24, 2010.

(8.) “Tea Party Seeks to Spotlight the ‘Horrors’ of Illegal Immigration,” Fox News, August 3, 2010.

(9.) Randal C. Archibold, “Immigration Bill Reflects a Firebrand’s Impact,” *New York Times*, April 19, 2010.

(10.) NBC News/*Wall Street Journal* monthly tracking poll, n = 1,000 each wave; http://pollingreport.com/politics.htm.

(11.) The scholarship that identifies these parties as populist is too extensive to catalogue here. In no particular order, the following have been most helpful: Mudde 2007; Kriesi 2014. For a contrasting view on what motivates the reactionary parties in Europe, as well as the appellation “radical right,” see, e.g., Eger and Valdez 2014. Other work questions the theoretical validity of populism as a means of explaining the “radical right.” For this point of view, see Aslandis 2015.

(12.) For the European side of the Atlantic, see Ivarsflaten 2008. On the American side, see Parker and Barreto 2013.

(13.) Among others, see Rydgren 2008; Berning and Schlueter 2015; Eger and Valdez 2015.

Christopher Parker

Christopher Sebastian Parker is Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington. He is the author of two award-winning books: Change They Can’t Believe In: The Tea Party and Reactionary Politics in America (Princeton University Press) and Fighting for Democracy: Black Veterans and the Struggle Against White Supremacy in the Postwar South (Princeton University Press). He is at work on another book, White Fright: Race and the Crisis of American Politics, from the Ku Klux Klan to Donald Trump. He resides in Seattle.

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 07 February 2018

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 07 February 2018